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Abstract:  
This paper analyses the role of collateral in loan contracting when companies are financed by 
multiple bank lenders and relationship lending can be present. We conjecture and empirically 
validate that relationship lenders, who enjoy an informational advantage over arm’s-length 
banks, are more senior to strengthen their bargaining power in future renegotiation if 
borrower’s face financial distress. This deters costly conflicts between lenders and fosters 
workout decisions by the best informed party. 
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that relationship lender in general have a higher 
probability to be collateralized, and a higher degree of collateralization (i.e. seniority). 
Furthermore, we show that seniority and the status of relationship lending increases the 
likelihood that a bank invests in a risky workout of distressed borrowers. Both findings 
support the view that collateral is a strategic instrument intended to influence the bargaining 
position of banks. Our result further suggest that seniority and relationship lending are 
complementary to each other. 
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workouts 1.   Introduction 
Multiple banking and relationship lending are two important characteristics describing a typical 
bank based financial system. The former, multiple banking, implies that different, non-
syndicated banks lend money to a particular firm at any given moment. The latter, relationship 
lending, implies that there is a long term, information intensive contractual relationship between 
a single bank and a particular borrower. Yet, there is an inherent conflict between these two fea-
tures. It becomes apparent when a borrower enters in a state of financial distress. Then, financi-
ers have to decide on debt restructuring, fresh money to allow workout activities, or simply liq-
uidation. 
With multiple source lending, the primary problem of resolving financial distress is to achieve 
coordination of lenders. Since claimants mutually have to decide on liquidation or continuation 
of the borrower’s operations, coordination failures can lead to (socially) inefficient distress deci-
sions, for example by triggering a run on the borrower’s assets, or by increasing deadweight 
costs of renegotiation. In this context, Welch (1997) shows that ex ante fixed seniority of lenders 
can serve as an instrument to strategically allocate bargaining power between lenders, thereby 
deterring costly conflicts ex post.  
In this paper we conjecture that i) collateral in corporate bank debt financing primarily serves to 
set seniority between multiple bank lenders, ii) the bank presumably best suited to decide on  
continuation or liquidation of distressed borrowers has the highest degree of collateralization (or 
seniority), and iii) that both issues systematically affect the decision of bank lenders to engage in 
risky workouts of distressed borrowers. The objective of the paper is to provide empirical evi-
dence on all of these conjectures.     
  1Hence, we adopt Welch’s (1997) explanation of the role of collateral in loan contracting and 
argue that relationship lending and loan collateralization are complementary institutions poten-
tially designed (and ex ante agreed on) to minimize ex ante costs of coordination failure (hence-
forth: complement hypothesis). The special emphasis on relationship lending is due to the alleged 
role of relationship lenders to make different decisions in renegotiations and borrower distress 
due to their implicit long-term horizon and their information privilege, as emphasized e.g. by 
Rajan (1992), Allen/Gale (1995), and Boot (2000).  
Our empirical study thus addresses two prominent features of bank debt in corporate finance: on 
the one hand seniority or collateralization of bank loans and on the other close ties between a 
firm and one bank that is special in the sense of relationship lending. The analysis proceeds in 
two major steps. First, we examine the determinants of loan collateralization and thus the alloca-
tion of collateral between lenders in normal times of borrower’s business operations. Second, we 
analyze whether the existence of a relationship lender and seniority of lenders affects bank’s 
decisions to invest in risky workouts if borrower’s actually face financial distress.   
The empirical analysis relies on a unique data set that was collected from credit-files of five ma-
jor universal banks in Germany, the prime example for a bank-based financial sys. Consistent 
with our conjectures, we find that the allocation of collateral is strongly correlated with the in-
tensity of bank-firm relationships, and with a bank’s willingness to engage in the workout of a 
distressed borrower. We interpret these findings as evidence in favor of the complement hy-
pothesis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the idea of collateral as a complement to 
relationship lending in more detail, relating it to the literature. In Section 3 we analyze empiri-
cally the role of collateral in lending contracts. We first examine the determinants of collaterali-
  2zation with the focus on the type of collateral, the incidence of relationship lending, and multiple 
bank lending. Then, we measure involvement of banks in workout activities if borrower’s actu-
ally face financial distress. Taken together, the analysis relates collateral to relationship lending, 
and to workout activities in distress, establishing a direct test of the complement hypothesis. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the results in the light of financial systems architecture and concludes.  
 
2. Collateral and Relationship Lending 
What influence does collateral have on the behavior of the borrower and (multiple) creditors in 
corporate bank lending? The answer to this question depends on the type of collateral under con-
sideration (see Bester 1994). Either collateral is based on particular assets coming from outside 
the firm (outside collateral, like a portfolio of securities, or a personal guarantee by a third 
party), or collateral is based on particular assets from inside the firm (inside collateral, like ma-
chinery, equipment, buildings). In the case of outside assets, collateral increases payments to the 
bank in borrower default, may resolve problems of adverse selection, affects incentives for stra-
tegic default by the borrower, and can substitute for information about project quality (see Be-
sanko/Thakor 1987, Bester 1994 and Bolton/Scharfstein 1996, and Manove/Padilla/Pagano 
2001, respectively).  In the case of inside assets, however, collateral serves different functions, in 
particular defining priority over future cash flows of the firm among lenders, but also providing 
incentives and/or valuable information for monitoring (see Rajan/Winton 1995).      
In this paper, we will ignore the role of collateral as a signaling device because signaling solves 
problems of adverse selection before contracts are written. Our sample of bank-borrower rela-
tionships has a fairly long duration of already established relationships, however. In this context, 
  3signaling models have no clear implication. For the purpose of our analysis, the role of collateral 
determining seniority between multiple lenders (i.e. inside collateral) is essential.    
The seniority of a bank due to collateral rights affects it’s bargaining position in the presence of 
multiple lending. If corporate assets are already pledged to existing lenders, the borrower will 
find it hard to attract additional debt from third sources, because he can offer nothing but junior 
debt to investors. Furthermore, the right of a senior lender to seize “his” company assets is a se-
rious threat to all other stakeholders, in particular to other, secondary banks. The reason is that 
the seizure of real assets is likely to affect both the liquidation and going concern value of the 
remaining assets of the firm. Since collateral decisions of one lender has wealth effects for other 
lenders, seniority can be seen as an instrument by which bargaining power is allocated between 
lenders. This is the interpretation for the role of collateral in loan contract design that is at the 
heart of this paper and in particular underlying our complement hypothesis between relationship 
lending and collateral.  
Indeed, much of the theoretical literature on relationship lending emphasizes that the need for 
monitoring intense financing of certain types of firms makes collateral an essential characteristic 
of loan contracts and requires “the proximity between bank and borrower that comes with rela-
tionship [lending]” (Boot 2000, p. 15).  Relationship lending is defined as a long-term implicit 
contract between a bank and its debtor.
1 Due to information acquisition and repeated interaction 
with the borrower over time, the relationship bank accumulates private information. This infor-
mation privilege commits both parties to each other, often interpreted as close ties between the 
bank and the borrower (see e.g. Sharpe 1990, Rajan 1992). From the perspective of the borrower, 
one economic rationale for allowing a lender to have an information privilege is the expectation 
  4that this relationship lender will make superior investment decisions than other, less informed 
lenders, if the firm faces financial distress (Rajan 1992, and Boot 2000). 
In the context of multiple source lending, it remains unclear how such a “pivotal” bank can im-
pose her workout policy given the coordination problems between the relationship lender and 
secondary lenders. Longhofer/Santos (2000) highlight the fact that it is the most senior lender 
who benefits first from revenues of a risky investment in a workout of a distressed borrower. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is the most senior lender who is most willing to invest in workouts.
2 
In turn, providing a relationship lender with the highest seniority renders informed lending more 
attractive to the borrower, thereby making the initiation of relationship lending more likely.  
Overall, it can be efficient to give seniority to the lender with the best information about the bor-
rower. These results point to the fact that relationship lending, seniority, and workout decision of 
banks are related to each other.  
The complementary nature of relationship lending and seniority is further supported by the 
analysis of Welch (1997), who shows that it can be optimal to give seniority ex ante to the lender 
who, in future (re-)negotiations, is likely to have the highest bargaining power. This arrangement 
minimizes coordination costs by deterring conflicts between lenders, thereby facilitating (effi-
cient) debt restructuring. Due to its information privilege and the resulting borrower lock-in, the 
relationship lender is the prime candidate to be made senior ex ante. Although Welch (1997) in 
his interpretation distinguishes between banks and other types of lenders (trade creditors, bond 
holders), his theory can be interpreted as well as representing one relationship lender and several 
other (secondary) banks. The special role of banks in Welch’s interpretation is related to better 
organization and reorganization skills. This can as well hold for the distinction between relation-
ship lenders and arm’s-length banks, but relying on the information privilege and the induced 
  5commitment between the borrower and the relationship lender is an even stronger argument in 
this context.  
Finally, Bris/Welch (2002) show that concentrated creditors (again, relationship lenders) are at a 
relative advantage in financial distress because they face lower coordination and free-riding 
costs making it easier to enforce their contractual obligations. 
In combination, the preceding arguments support our conjecture that making the relationship 
lender’s claim senior over all other claims can help to resolve the coordination problem between 
informed and uninformed lenders. Seniority in this context refers to the priority given to a collat-
eralized lender with respect to future cash flow of the firm, either from liquidation of assets, or 
from the income stream. Thus, in the following, we equate collateral with the earning assets of 
the company, tangible and non-tangible, i.e. inside collateral.
 3  
The existing evidence on loan contract design, the number of creditors, and relationship lending 
supports some of the essential features addressed in the outlined theories. Berger/Udell (1990, 
1995), Petersen/Rajan (1994, 1995), Carey (1995), and Degryse/van Cayseele (2000) provide 
evidence that loan contracts are typically collateralized. 
Regarding empirical predictions on multiple lending and the existence of relationship lending, 
most available evidence indicates that multiple bank lending is the rule rather than the exception 
in corporate finance for mid-cap and large-cap companies (see e.g. Ongena/Smith 2001, Detri-
agiache/Garella/Guiso 2000). Furthermore, empirical studies analysing relationship lending in 
the context of multiple bank lending (e.g. Petersen/Rajan 1995, Elsas/Krahnen 1998, and De-
gryse/van Cayseele 2000) observe behavioral bank patterns consistent with relationship lending, 
like increased credit availability in general and the provision of liquidity insurance if borrower 
quality deteriorates. Thus, firms typically maintain more than one bank relationship, and one of 
  6them can be an informationally intense relationship.
4  For example, in the sample used by  El-
sas/Krahnen 1998, firms where one bank explicitly claimed to be the relationship lender have 4 
bank relationships on average.
5  
Using the insights from the preceding analysis of the literature, we can restate and sharpen the 
empirical predictions (or conjectures) outlined in the introduction: First, firms typically have 
more than one (bank) lender. Second, collateral rights typically serve the purpose to fix seniority 
among multiple lenders. Third, we observe relationship lending and multiple banking jointly, 
though not necessarily in all cases. Fourth, the relationship lender has a higher seniority than 
arm’s-length banks. Fifth, the relationship lender should be the bank most willing to get actively 
involved in workout investments.  
This paper will present new evidence on each of these predictions. It is tested whether the ob-
served allocation of collateral is consistent with the idea of collateral being an instrument which 
strategically influences (expected) renegotiations between a company and it’s multiple bank 
lenders. The complementary nature of collateral and relationship lending, which is our main hy-
pothesis, is in particular reflected in predictions 4 and 5 and will be analysed empirically in the 
subsequent section. This is the main contribution of our study to the literature. 
  
3. Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1   The Credit File Data 
The data underlying our analysis has been collected from the credit files of five major German 
banks, including Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Bayerische Vereinsbank (now HypoVereins-
bank), Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (now DZ Bank), and Westdeutsche Landesbank 
(WestLB).
6 All of these banks are universal banks with credit business in the small, medium and 
  7large firm size segment; three banks are private, one is a mutual (DZ), one is a savings bank 
(Landesbank).  
The data set is a 5 years-panel, containing general company characteristics (e.g. age, industry, 
legal form), specific loan contract characteristics (e.g. collateral, maturity, exposure, credit lines, 
contractual interest rate), balance sheet data, and the bank’s assessment of borrower default 
probability (internal ratings). The firms were sampled randomly from a population of all corpo-
rate customers who had active business with one of the banks at some time between January 
1992 and December 1996, and who matched further selection criteria.
7  There were four such 
criteria: firm size, loan size, location of the headquarters, and type of loans. 
First, companies had to be medium sized, defined by annual turnover between DM 50m and DM 
500m (US$ 25m -US$ 250m). Since firms in this size bracket typically do not issue public debt, 
they are not covered by rating agencies either. Absent rigorous disclosure requirements (as in 
Germany),
8 we expect asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers to play an impor-
tant role. It therefore constitutes a perfect population to study the relationship lending and loan 
contract design.  
Second, to ensure a minimum level of information on all banks of the borrowers, a minimum 
total loan size of DM 3m (US$ 1.5m) was imposed.
9 All loans surpassing DM 3m are subject to 
the regulatory notification requirement of Article 14 of the KWG (German Banking Act), and 
have to be communicated to a national credit bureau.
10 Third, borrowers with headquarters in the 
former GDR (East Germany) were excluded, just as, fourth, borrowers without at least one 
longer-term investment loan, to enable observing loans with fixed maturity and repayment 
schedule.
11  
  8These four criteria were applied to generate what we label the “representative sample”, to be 
used for the analysis of the determinants of loan collateralization under normal times of business 
operations of borrowers in Section 3.2. It consists of 25 borrowers from each of the five banks, 
resulting in a total of 125 credit relationships. For each of these borrowers, the full set of vari-
ables was recorded from the credit files whenever a credit decision (e.g. loan renewal, or change 
in loan amount) was documented, or a re-rating occurred. The observation period comprises five 
complete years (1992 to 1996). Thus, for example, for a credit relationship with three credit de-
cisions and one additional re-rating, there are four observations per variable. The advantage of 
such a procedure is that for all structural variables such as loan amount, collateralization, or bor-
rower rating, we have the complete time series over the observation period. In order to avoid a 
potential bias due to non-synchronous data collection, we stratified our panel by yielding one 
annual observation at the end of each year between 1992 and 1996, using always the last avail-
able - and by design of the data collection appropriate -  observation.  
This leads to a synchronous panel data set with a theoretical number of 625 observations per 
variable.
12 The actual number of observations is smaller, since there are some relationships that 
started either later than 1992, or ended earlier than 1996, and there were also missing observa-
tions.  
The analysis of bank behavior if borrowers actually face financial distress in Section 3.3 will be 
based on the so-called “distress sample”, taken from the same population of borrowers. The sam-
ple selection meets the four criteria of the representative sample, augmented by a fifth criterion: 
Borrower must have received a poor (negative) rating at least once during the observation pe-
riod. Poor ratings indicate that banks expect these borrowers to be problematic, i.e. potentially 
distressed. In the standardized 6-notches rating system that we use to calibrate the risk assess-
  9ments of different banks, the notches 5 or 6 are reserved for negative ratings (notches 1-4 being 
investment grade). The distressed sample consists of 5 x 15 borrowers.  
Thus, the overall number of firms in our sample is 200, out of which 125 were sampled from the 
full population, and 75 were sampled from the distress subset of this population. Though theo-
retically possible, there was no overlap between the two samples. Note that the data set consists 
of the information taken from the credit files of only one of the company’s bankers the company 
may have (henceforth “our bank”), and typically has additional banks, whose credit files we do 
not observe. 
  
Characteristics of the Sample 
The data source and the sampling procedure lead to specific characteristics of the sample. First, 
and most important, the sample consists of firms that typically do not rely on public debt mar-
kets, and which are believed to be subject to high degree of (potential) informational asymme-
tries. Not astonishingly, we find that none of the sample firms is exchange listed, and none of the 
sample firms has issued public debt in the past. Therefore, bank financing turns out to be the 
single most important source of outside financing.
13 This evidently makes a relatively simple 
debt structure, and a low number of creditor classes which have to be taken into account in our 
subsequent empirical analysis.
14
Furthermore, to examine the monitoring role of banks it is important to incorporate all instru-
ments that can be used to exert influence on management decisions. In the context of our analy-
sis, it is remarkable that there is no firm where equity holdings by a bank are reported (in line 
with our expectation about the ownership structure of medium-sized companies in Germany, 
  10which are mainly family-owned). Thus, the credit relationship is the only means by which banks 
can possibly exert monitoring and management control.
15
More technically, the sampling design guarantees our data to be a comprehensive and complete 
projection of all relevant information documented in the bank’s credit files. The data collection 
was conceptually and organizationally supported by the banks joining the research project. 
Therefore, we had unrestricted access to all sources of information and documents about the bor-
rowers available to the banks themselves.
16 This suggests a high quality of data, in particular in 
comparison to survey-based data.  
The access to credit files allowed a detailed record of the different internal rating systems used 
by these banks. All institutions produce two internal ratings, one with and one without consider-
ing the value of pledged collateral.
17 In what follows we rely solely on the latter notion, i.e., in-
ternal ratings are a measure of expected default risk for an uncollateralized exposure.  
All banks used rating systems that were comparable in terms of methodology and data input, 
allowing the transformation of the different scales into one “master scale”. This standardized 
scale ranges from 1 (highest quality, lowest default risk) to 6 (worst quality, highest default risk). 
According to the internal guidelines, these ratings are intended to capture the unconditional de-
fault probability over a one-year horizon. The rating notch attributed to a certain borrower, there-
fore, corresponds to a particular risk class.
18
 The re-calibration was based on the qualitative in-
formation provided by the bank internal rating guidelines. Although we believe that this re-
calibration of ratings does not affect their information value,
19 we will provide robustness checks 
of all our respective results by using standard risk proxies as substitutes for internal ratings (no-
tably firm profitability and standard deviation of profits). 
   
  11Identification of Relationship Lending  
With respect to the identification of relationship lending, we rely primarily on the German notion 
of a “housebank”, a well defined term in the context of German banking. It refers to a company’s 
primary financier, who is said to have access to more relevant, and more timely information than 
arm’s-length lenders. Furthermore, housebanks allegedly take special responsibility if their bor-
rowers are in financial distress (see for example Fischer 1990, and Elsas/Krahnen 1998 for cor-
roborating evidence). For the purpose of this analysis, we treat the notions of the housebank and 
relationship lending synonymously. Banks may be either a housebank for their client, or they are 
not. In the latter case we speak of an “arm’s-length bank” (see Rajan 1992). 
In order to assess the housebank status for a given bank-borrower relationship, we rely primarily 
on the self-assessment of the relevant credit officer at our bank (in charge of that particular cus-
tomer). The credit manager was given a questionnaire asking for a housebank attribution ("Do 
you feel that your bank is the housebank for that particular client?"). The respondents had to 
check "yes" or "no", and were further asked to give a brief explanation in writing. Then a second 
variable, with information taken from the credit files, was used to double check the reliability of 
the credit officer’s attribution. Whenever, in the credit files, a particular decision taken by the 
bank in question was explained using arguments explicitly related to a housebank status (e.g. 
"we are the housebank", "we are the main bank", "we have a special responsibility"), this was 
coded into the data set. Since this attribution was recorded separately for every credit event, a 
time series of attributions results. From these two housebank proxies we construct an indicator 
variable, HB, which is used in the subsequent analyses. HB takes the value 1 for all relationships 
that are consistently grouped as "housebank" in both attributions, the self-assessment of the bank 
and the analysis of credit-file statements, and at all times. HB equals zero, in contrast, if both 
attributions classify the credit-relationship consistently as “non-housebank”, or if they are incon-
  12sistent, or change over time. Thus our HB variable minimizes the Type-I-error, i.e., it minimizes 
the probability of assigning the housebank status when, in fact, this is false. Note, however, that 
our empirical results are robust in the sense of being qualitatively unaffected if instead the raw, 
unmodified self-assessment of the banks is used.
20
Remarkably, our housebank attribution differs substantially from measures of relationship inten-
sity commonly used in the literature, such as duration or the number of bank lenders. To provide 
some insights into these alternative measures, Table I documents descriptive statistics (see Elsas 
(2002) for further details).  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Insert Table I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
 
From column 2 of Table I it is apparent that the length of the bank-borrower relationship (dura-
tion) does not differ significantly between housebanks and arm’s-length banks. On the other 
hand, the “number of bank relationships” as well as the “debt share financed by our bank” both 
differ significantly between housebanks and arm’s-length banks. If a housebank is involved in 
firm‘s debt structure, the number of banks is smaller and the financing share of the housebank is 
larger, on average. These stylized observations are compatible with predictions based on the the-
ory of relationship lending, see e.g. Boot (2000). It is also suggested by Table I, that duration is a 
poor proxy for capturing relationship lending - at least for our sample of bank borrower relation-
ships with a very fairly average duration - while the financing share is a better substitute for 
housebanking, though also far from perfect.  
  13The indicator variable HB is a new proxy of relationship lending. It is as close as one can get to 
capture the distinction between relationship lending and arm’s-length bank-borrower relation-
ships, since it is based on the self-assessment of one of the parties to the implicit contract of rela-
tionship lending.  
 
Collateral 
Table II provides information on borrower characteristics in the representative sample. On aver-
age, bank debt accounts for 55% of total liabilities. The share of our banks in total debt of the 
borrowers amounts to 38%, on average. Firms are highly indebted, with equity accounting for 
only 20 percent of all funds. This number is close to the average equity stake in all German cor-
porations, see Bundesbank (2002) for a recent update. Most borrowers are incorporated (81%), 
as expected for firms in this size class. Those that are not are foremost the smallest firms with 
turnover below 100m DM.   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
Insert Table II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
To gain some insights on the type and frequency of collateral we use three variables. The inci-
dence and qualitative characteristics of collateral are captured by COLYN and COLTYPE. 
COLYN is binary, taking a value of one if the loan is collateralized, and zero otherwise. 
COLTYPE is a categorical variable, assigning the value zero if a credit relationship is not collat-
eralized, the value one if at least one of the loans of the sample firm provided by one of our 
banks is secured by company assets (like e.g. land charges, mortgages, assignments of accounts 
  14receivable) alone, the value two if the loan is secured by non-company assets (e.g. personal 
guarantees) only, and the value three if company and non-company assets are combined. Thus, 
COLTYPE breaks down the observation COLYN equal to one according to the type of security. 
COLTYPE allows to distinguish between inside and outside collateral, i.e. collateral based on a 
company’s earning assets, or inside wealth, and collateral based on extra-company, or outside, 
wealth.  
A third variable, labeled COLDEGREE, is a quantitative measures of the degree to which out-
standing loans are collateralized. It is defined as the ratio of collateral value (as assessed by the 
bank) to total debt supplied by our bank. The variable is bounded from below by zero, as collat-
eral cannot be negative. It is not bounded from above, as the current value of collateral may ex-
ceed outstanding debt. It is multiplied by a scaling factor of 100. A value of COLDEGREE of 
“100” or more refers to a bank that is fully secured. The bank, according to its own assessment, 
has zero expected loss. As explained above, collateral may be valuable to lenders not only for its 
market value, but also for its threat value. Therefore, COLDEGREE equal to zero does not imply 
the absence of priority rights on firm assets. In particular, the bank may estimate the market 
value of the collateral to be zero, but it may still retain the right to withdraw the physical asset. 
This, in turn, will influence the decisions of the borrower or other lenders.  
Table III below shows the frequency distribution of observations for COLYN differentiated by 
the variable BANK, which depicts our bank, i.e. the bank from which the credit file data observa-
tion originates; it’s values range from 1 to 5.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
Insert Table III
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  15Table III shows considerable variation between the banks in our sample, in particular with re-
spect to the percentage of collateralized loans. For example, in the period 1992-1996, 14% of 
Bank 1 observations are not collateralized, while this number amounts to 66% in case of Bank 3. 
Clearly, we will have to control for bank heterogeneity in the regression analysis.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Insert Figure 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
 
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of COLDEGREE on the range of values from 0 to 100 
for the total sample period and all individuals.
21 Note the significant peak at value zero. This 
pattern highlights the fact that the ratio of collateral value to credit volume is a left censored 
variable because all unsecured loans are assigned a value of “0”, and some collateral rights may 
have value of zero. Thus, an analysis using the variable COLDEGREE has to employ a Tobit-
procedure.  
Finally, Table IV provides some statistics on loan collateralization according to type of collateral 
(COLTYPE) housebank status (HB) for one sample year, 1996. In addition, it shows the mean 
rating (RATING) and the degree of collateralization COLDEGREE for all possible combinations 
of HB and COLTYPE. Recall that these internal bank ratings estimate the probability of default 
gross of collateral (borrower ratings).  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
Insert Table IV
  16--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
 
Table IV uses 98 valid observations on collateralization for the year 1996, of which 35 % can be 
attributed to housebank relationships. 30 out of 98 observations have no collateral. None of the 
remaining 68 relationships rely exclusively on inside collateral (like guarantees).  
With respect to the housebank status, Table IV reveals that arm’s-length banks tend to contract 
more frequently for a simultaneous inclusion of personal and real securities (12/64 versus 3/34 
for housebanks). The ratio of non-collateralized cases to total cases is about equal for both types 
of relationships (10/34 versus 20/64). The mean rating across all types of collateral is signifi-
cantly lower for housebank relationships (2.8 versus 3.2), indicating that housebank borrowers, 
on average, are expected to have lower default probability. Furthermore, the univariate analysis 
in Table IV reveals no significant differences regarding type of collateral and degree of collater-
alization. 
The breakdown according to type of collateral reveals that, given that assets are pledged as col-
lateral, all cases involve company assets, a few cases add non-company assets on top, and not a 
single case involves non-company assets alone. This is an indication that, at least in our sample 
of mid-cap German firms, collateral primarily serves to determine the seniority structure among 
bank lenders.
22
In summary, three characteristics of our data will influence the empirical design of the study. 
First, bank heterogeneity. This may to some extent reflect differing credit management policies 
between banks, but will also be due to heterogeneity between firms. Second, personal securities 
(outside collateral extending the pledgeable wealth of firms beyond the value of their assets) are 
  17never the only type of collateral being pledged, and collateral on company assets (inside collat-
eral) is the predominant type of collateral, thus determining seniority. This pattern is consistent 
with our empirical predictions concerning the complementary role of relationship lending (the 
housebank status) and collateral. Third, the degree of collateralization in terms of value is a cen-
sored variable, which will bear on the econometric method used. 
 
 
3.2  Determinants and Allocation of Collateral in Lending Relationships  
Design of the Empirical  Model 
In this section, we examine the main determinants of collateral in loan contracting, as they ap-
pear in the representative data set, i.e. under normal business conditions. We start by discussing 
the design of the empirical model. 
Under the complement hypothesis advanced earlier, it is expected that relationship lending and 
the provision of collateral are complementary to one another. This implies that the incidence of 
the housebank status increases the priors of finding the loan collateralized. Furthermore, the de-
gree of collateralization should also be higher for housebanks than for arm’s-length banks. The 
reason is that the housebank holds an informational advantage over arm’s-length banks and is 
therefore best prepared to bargain with a borrower, in case of financial distress. This is true even 
if the market value of collateral turns out to be low in an actual distress situation, as long as a 
physical withdrawal of the asset poses a threat to the smooth operation of the company. We will 
analyze both variants of the collateral hypothesis in this section, with COLYN and with 
COLDEGREE as dependent variables. 
  18We are estimating panel regressions, assuming a one factor random effects specification. This 
allows to use the full sample while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among individu-
als.
23 Since COLYN is a dichotomous variable, we use a probit specification for our first regre-
sion. Furthermore, since COLDEGREE is a censored variable we use a Tobit-formulation for our 
second regression.
24  We are going to test variants of equation (1). 
(, , Collateral f controls risk relationship = )                                            (1) 
The explanatory variables can be grouped as control variables, risk variables, and relationship 
variables, respectively. The group of general controls comprises a proxy for firm size, LOGSIZE, 
measured as the natural logarithm of a company’s annual sales. LIMLIAB is a dummy variable, 
indicating limited liability of the borrower. A set of dummies for the individual bank from which 
the credit file observation originates is included to control for inter-bank heterogeneity (BANK2 - 
BANK5), Bank 1 serving as a benchmark. Finally, to control for the company asset structure 
(which may affect the potential of the firm to provide collateral in the first place), we include an 
index of research and development expenses (R&D) measured on an industry level.
25 All other 
general and time-invariant characteristics (like industry affiliation etc.) are controlled for by the 
random effects. 
Expected default risk is likely to influence the demand for collateral in loan contracts. It is prox-
ied by bank internal borrower ratings. Since RATING is an ordinal variable, dummy variables are 
used to differentiate between borrowers according to quality. RATING3 and RATING4,5 are used 
in the regression, while the prime risk classes (RATING 1 and 2) with the lowest default prob-
abilities serve as the reference group.
26 Firm profitability (PROFIT) and it’s volatility (VOLA) 
are also supposed to capture company quality. They are used as a robustness test for bank inter-
nal ratings. PROFIT is measured as return on assets, based on profits before taxes and extraordi-
  19nary items. VOLA is calculated as it’s respective standard deviation over all time series observa-
tions per individual and thus time-invariant. 
The key variable in this regression measures the effect of relationship lending. It is represented 
by the variable HB, referring to the housebank status of the lender in a given relationship. Given 
that collateral in our data set is dominated by company assets (inside collateral), the complement 
hypothesis suggests a positive coefficient of the relationship variables.  
Finally, we construct the variable #BANKS that accounts for the total number of banks with ac-
tive business with the company. Since the number of banks and the housebank status are related 
to each other, we further include the interaction term of the two variables, HB x #BANKS. 
27  
Table V summarizes the definitions of all variables.  
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Regression Results 
The results of the panel analysis are presented in Table VI. We estimate the determinants of the 
allocation of collateral using three specifications of equation (1). Model I reports a Probit-
analysis, estimating the determinants of the binary collateral variable COLYN. Model II presents 
the results of a Tobit-analysis, using the degree of collateralization as dependent variable 
(COLDEGREE). The right hand side of both regressions are identical. With Model III we vary  
some of the explanatory variables used in Model II, in particular the measures of borrower risk 
or quality.  
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The results are as follows. Control variable estimates are stable across all models. As expected, 
there is heterogeneity among banks with respect to their collateral decisions. Three out of four 
bank-dummy coefficients are significantly different from the reference, Bank 1.
28 Company size 
(LOGSIZE) has no significant influence on the incidence of collateralization (Model I), but af-
fects the degree thereof, conditional on a loan being collateralized. Firms with limited liability 
(LIMLIAB) are less frequently collateralized; and also to a lower degree. Finally, firms from in-
dustries with higher average research and development expenses (R&D) have a lower probabil-
ity for the incidence and a lower degree of collateralization. This may reflect different asset 
structures between industries and therefore the potential of firms to provide banks with a claim 
on physical assets.  
We next turn to the risk variables. It is interesting to observe that in neither regression the coeffi-
cients of the rating dummies are significant.
29 As indicated by the estimates of Model III in 
Table VI, the insignificance of borrower quality or risk remains valid if one uses the alternative 
(and more standard) proxies PROFIT and VOLA. The former is insignificant, while the latter is 
statistically significant but negligible in terms of economic impact throughout. All other esti-
mates in Model III remain qualitatively unchanged, however. 
Hence, in our sample of mid-sized German companies, collateral in loan agreements does not 
respond to different levels of default risk of the lender. To put it differently, the role of collateral 
in these contracts cannot solely be to trade off repayment risk, else it were responsive to the level 
  21of these risks. Since under the complement hypothesis collateral serves a different purpose, the 
result is compatible with a role of collateral as an strategic instrument for renegotiations, though 
not conclusive. 
We now turn to the key variable, relationship lending. Under the complement hypothesis one 
should expect relationship lenders to be collateralized more frequently and to a higher extent. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient of HB is positive and significantly different from 
zero in all regressions. This result also holds when using different risk proxies (see Model III). 
A higher number of creditors significantly reduces the degree of collateralization, but not the 
probability of a bank to become secured. Since we include in the first and the second regression 
the number of bank relationships and the housebank dummy simultaneously, this implies that 
relationship lending is a determinant of loan contract design that goes beyond the impact of ob-
taining credit just by a smaller number of banks.  
As further (unreported) robustness tests to these results we ran several regressions with varying 
specifications, each taking one of following issues into account: 
 
•  Time effects and Industry Affiliation: We included a full set of year dummies and/or 
industry dummies as explanatory variables. These were insignificant. 
•  Capital Structure: We augmented the explanatory variables by the variable 
LEVERAGE as another proxy for the capital structure of the borrowers. The respec-
tive coefficient was insignificant.  
•  Relationship Lending: We included additional measures for relationship lending, 
DURATION and FINSHARE, as explanatory variables. DURATION was insignificant, 
while FINSHARE had a weak negative impact on collateralization.  
  22Neither of these robustness exercises affected the overall qualitative results, in particular the 
positive and significant coefficient of the housebank variable. This indicates that the finding of 
relationship lenders being more senior than arm’s-length banks is a very robust result.   
This result is consistent with the complement hypothesis, which is primarily based on the argu-
ment by Welch (1997) that seniority or inside collateral should be allocated ex ante to the ex post 
strongest bank in future renegotiations to deter costly conflicts of lenders. While our evidence so 
far is consistent with this explanation, it is not the only one that is able to explain the pattern in 
our data. For example, the existence of a simple cost advantage on the side of housebanks in 
assessing the value of collateral would imply similar coefficients.  
Hence, in order to differentiate between the renegotiation argument on the one side and other 
explanations (as for example the cost advantage hypothesis) on the other side, we need to know 
whether, once the borrower is in distress, seniority of the housebank affects it’s lending deci-
sions. We are effectively testing whether relationship lending (our variable HB) provides a link 
between pre-distress collateral allocation and in-distress workout investment. To extend our test 
to the role of housebanks in distress, we can rely on the complementary data set of actually dis-
tressed firms.  
 
3.3. Collateral and Relationship Lending in Borrower Distress 
The Main Hypothesis and Descriptive Statistics 
The preceding section established that relationship lenders have a higher seniority (possess more 
collateral) than arm’s-length lenders. According to the complement hypothesis, we interpret this 
finding as an indication of a role of collateral to determine ex ante the bargaining power of bank 
  23lenders in borrower distress. With sufficient collateral at hand, in particular the housebank will 
be able to play a formative role in bargaining situations that are caused by borrower distress. If 
there are multiple lenders, and bargaining costs are thus high, collateral is instrumental in deter-
ring costly conflicts between lenders and enforcing the decision of the bank best suited to decide 
on firm continuation or liquidation – the relationship lender.  According to the results of the pre-
vious section, collateral is primarily based on company assets, and non-company assets are a 
minor part of the wealth pledged to lenders (see Table III).  Therefore, the allocation of collateral 
is in fact the allocation of seniority. Since the most senior lender benefits first from a successful 
reorganization of the borrower, we should expect that the housebank status, and the degree of 
collateralization are positively related to the likelihood of a workout involvement of a bank. This 
constitutes the major test of the complement hypothesis.  
To derive a suitable design of the corresponding empirical model, one has to model a bank deci-
sion on continuation or liquidation of a distressed borrower. Since this is basically an investment 
decision under uncertainty, the empirical model needs to capture the corresponding determi-
nants, augmented by variables necessary to conduct the test of the complement hypothesis. For 
the latter, in particular variables reflecting multiple lending, relationship lending, and collateral 
are essential. 
Let us start by considering the investment decision under uncertainty and the role of relationship 
lending therein. If a borrower faces financial distress, it may be efficient either to liquidate the 
firm right away, or to restructure it. An additional investment, which is needed to carry out a 
workout, is worth its while if it is a positive net present value project. Otherwise, for a negative 
present value, the bank will not be willing to extend additional loans, or to take any other sup-
portive action.
30 The lender will rather pull back and, perhaps, trigger the liquidation of the com-
pany.  
  24Given a troubled loan, a supportive action by a particular lender is more likely, ceteris paribus, 
(i) the more senior his claim is over the claims of other creditors, (ii) the lower are expected bar-
gaining costs, and (iii) the lower is his uncertainty about the true quality of the borrower’s assets.  
Conditions (i) and (ii) refer to the coordination problem that emerges in borrower distress with 
multiple lenders. Relationship lending and the accumulation of collateral are seen as comple-
mentary to resolve this free-riding problem, as explained above. The third condition is especially 
true for those lenders with private information. Hence, all three conditions are met by relation-
ship lenders (and therefore housebanks), supporting our assertion that these do engage more fre-
quently in workouts than arm’s-length lenders. 
In summary, we should observe a positive correlation between the occurrence of workout activi-
ties, the degree of collateralization, and the existence of a relationship lender. Note, however,  
that neither the complement hypothesis nor our subsequent empirical analysis are concerned with 
the success of workout activities, we are solely concerned with the occurrence. 
We rely on the sample of distressed firms as already introduced in Section 3.1. Recall that it 
comprises credit-file data of 75 medium-sized German companies over the five-year period 
1992-1996, who had received a distress rating at least once during this period. The distress sam-
ple contains the same information as available for the representative sample, i.e. contract terms, 
balance sheet information, relationship and internal rating data. In addition, it comprises detailed 
information on distress-related activities by the bank. This information is mainly of qualitative 
nature, for example indicating whether additional collateral has been pledged, or whether the 
amount of outstanding debt has changed (including debt forgiveness, loan redemption, or the 
provision of new loans). The data also include information on the termination of a bank-
borrower relationship, and commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. 
  25The structure of the distress sample differs from the representative sample in so far, as observa-
tions are more frequent. This is due to the emergency situation which requires more frequent 
monitoring (or actions) by the bank. In some cases there are up to six contract modifications per 
year, as compared to the average number of one in the representative sample. Furthermore, in 
line with the nature of troubled firms, the survivorship rate is lower in the distress sample than in 
the representative sample. Given this structure, a panel analysis is inadequate and we focus on a 
cross-sectional analysis.  
Table VII provides some descriptive statistics on the distressed firms, differentiated by the 
housebank status.  
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According to Table VII, the general pattern of borrower and loan contract characteristics is simi-
lar to the representative sample. Housebanks do have a higher share in debt financing, and bor-
rowers within a housebank relationship maintain fewer bank relationships. Most importantly, 
however, housebanks have significantly more collateral. Hence, the necessary condition for the 
idea of collateral and relationship lending being complementary does hold for the distress sample 
even univariately, i.e. relationship lenders are more senior. 
In order to identify a banks involvement in a private workout we define a corresponding measure 
labeled WORKOUT. This variable takes the value one if i) bank activities relating to workout 
investments are documented in the credit files, and/or ii) financial support is explicitly docu-
  26mented. In particular, workout activities comprise the initiation or leadership of a lender syndi-
cate explicitly intended for restructuring, the provision of consultancy services provided or initi-
ated by the bank itself, an active search for a potential merger candidate, or any other activity 
indicating a serious involvement of the bank in restructuring.
31  
Due to the fixed observation period of our data collection (1992-1996), some workout activities 
will have started before the beginning, or they might have happened only after the end of the 
observation period. To avoid related problems of censoring, we require each company without 
observed workout activities to have at least one year of observation after the onset of financial 
distress. In addition, firms with contract termination during the initial two years of our sample 
period are excluded from the analysis. This leaves us with 62 firms for an analysis of the deter-
minants of bank’s workout decisions. 
(, , Workout f controls collateral relationship = )                                            (2) 
The analysis will be structured according to equation (2). Thus, we assume that workout activi-
ties depend on three sets of variables: controls for general firm heterogeneity, a measure for col-
lateralization, and finally one set capturing relationship lending and multiple bank lending. Con-
trol variables are firm size (LOGSIZE), limited liability (LIMLIAB), and leverage (LEVERAGE). 
In addition, we include return on assets to control for borrower quality (PROFIT).
32
For testing the complement hypothesis based on equation (2) we employ a logit regression, 
where the binary dependent variable (WORKOUT) is regressed on the housebank attribution 
(HB), the degree of collateralization, (COLDEGREE), as well as the interaction term of these two 
variables (HB x COLDEGREE), to control for the coordination-related function of collateral in 
relationship lending.  
  27As is well known in the literature and of particular importance regarding the complement hy-
pothesis, the decision to engage in a risky workout will depend on the severity of the coordina-
tion problem of lenders (see e.g. Bolton/Scharfstein 1996, Welch 1997). To control for this issue, 
we use either the variable FINSHARE or the number of banks (#BANKS).   
As before, FINSHARE is a proxy for the relative importance of our bank among all creditors of a 
firm, and measured by the bank’s share in total debt financing of the firm. Note that it is closely 
related to the Herfindahl-index of concentration of debt if one assumes that all other creditors 
have a financing share of 1/(N-1) of the remaining debt.
33 We will use interaction terms (HB x 
FINSHARE, FINSHARE x COLDEGREE) to sort out the joint effect of the financing share with 
relationship lending or collateralization, respectively.  
As a robustness test, we use the (natural logarithm) of a firm’s number of bank relationships, 
#BANKS, to control for the debt financing structure of the borrower, i.e. multiple lending.
34  
In general we expect the likelihood of a workout investment of bank to be increasing in it’s rela-
tive importance. Hence, the coefficient of #BANKS should be negative in general, but there is a 
countervailing force with the incidence of relationship lending. The reason is that under the com-
plement hypothesis, coordination of lenders is facilitated if a housebank with collateralized debt 
serves to deter costly conflicts among lenders. This could lead to an insignificant coefficient of 
#BANKS (though not a positive coefficient).  
For all variables, we use the most recent observation before the distress event. Table VIII gives 
cross-tabulations of housebank status, WORKOUT, and the individual banks. The variability of 
observations is sufficiently large to conduct a logit analysis. Since there are two banks with no 
workout involvement at all (4
th line in Table VIII), we will not include bank dummies in the 
model to avoid problems of estimation. 
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Regression Results 
Table IX shows the results of two logit models estimating the determinants of the workout inci-
dence. The main difference between the two specifications concerns the variables used to control 
for the severity of the coordination problem, i.e. the share of our bank in total debt financing of 
the borrower or the number of banks, respectively. The two models represent distinct attempts to 
capture the debt structure of the borrower with respect to multiple lending and heterogeneity in 
the relative importance of lenders. Clearly, if a creditor is offering management advice or at-
tempts to replace management, or is taking some other action that directly or indirectly affects 
the welfare of other lenders, he must be one of the large financiers of the institution, else his in-
volvement will neither be accepted by the other creditors, nor does it payoff to him in the first 
place. In Model I we use the share of our bank in overall debt of the firm as the indicator of his 
relative importance. This measure is appropriate if financing shares of banks (or other lenders 
like trade creditors) are heterogeneous (i.e. not close to 1/N), as to be expected in the presence of 
relationship lending.  
In Model II of Table IX we measure the debt structure of the borrower simply with the number 
of banks, thereby implicitly assuming that the importance of each institution is proportional to 
1/N, and that all important financiers are to be found among these banks. 
  29Since the debt financing share of our bank is 38 percent on average (and even 48% for house-
banks), it is apparent that heterogeneity is an important characteristic of the debt structure of the 
sample firms. Thus, a priori, the specification of Model I is more convincing. Model II serves as 
a robustness test.   
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The estimation results are as follows. Considering the structural variables first, there is firm het-
erogeneity in both specifications. The coefficients for LOGSIZE and LIMLIAB are negative and 
significant (LOGSIZE only in Model I). The coefficient of LEVERAGE, as a general measure for 
the relative importance of debt as a funding source, is negative and significantly different from 
zero. It indicates that, ceteris paribus, more debt in the capital structure tends to reduce the work-
out probability, having controlled for multiple lending, relationship lending and seniority.  
At the core of our analysis are the variables COLDEGREE and HB. In Model I, the coefficient of 
the housebank dummy is positive and significant, indicating that relationship lenders do engage 
more often in workouts. The coefficient of COLDEGREE is of the same sign and significant as 
well. This supports the hypothesis that seniority affects the likelihood of bank to engage in costly 
workouts. The hypothesis that relationship lending and collateral are complementary is strongly 
supported by both findings and the fact that the coefficient of the interaction term between HB 
and COLDEGREE is not significantly different from zero. In our interpretation, collateral serves 
to align interests of lenders by deterring costly conflicts. Relationship lending and collateral are 
therefore no substitutes (which would imply a significant, negative interaction term).  
  30Another interesting insight can be inferred from the coefficient of the interaction between 
FINSHARE and COLDEGREE, which is negative and significant. Both the financing share as well 
as collateralization directly affect the bargaining power of a bank vis-à-vis other lenders. Given 
this interpretation, a bank’s financing share is - at least to some extent - a substitute for the de-
gree of collateralization. To clarify, assume a bank were the exclusive debt financier of a firm 
(FINSHARE equal to 100%). In this case, additional collateral will have no impact on workout 
decisions since expected coordination conflicts with other lenders are zero anyway, and incre-
mental cash flows caused by workout activities will benefit the bank alone. Even if the bank 
were one financier among others, an increased financing share will still be a substitute for more 
collateral, inducing a negative coefficient on the interaction term, and positive coefficients on 
both direct effects.  
A similar argument does not hold for the housebank status and the financing share, however. The 
housebank status affects renegotiations by a different mechanism than FINSHARE because it 
relies primarily on the information privilege. Correspondingly, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is insignificant (though at the 11 percent level).  
Turning now to Model II, FINSHARE is replaced by #BANKS to test the robustness of results 
when varying the proxy for the debt financing structure and multiple bank lending. We find the 
major explanatory variables having the same signs as in our base model, while the overall model 
appears to be severely misspecified. The HB coefficient remains to be positive and significant, 
and the coefficient of the degree of collateral is also still positive, but it is insignificant. How-
ever, the coefficient of #BANKS is insignificant as well. A Likelihood-Ratio test against a model 
just specifying a constant term is insignificant, indicating that the group of regressors does not 
significantly add to the explanatory power of the model. This is also supported by the low 
McFadden-R
2. Since there are no apparent signs of misspecification for Model I, we attribute the 
  31low quality of Model II to the variable #BANKS, which seems to be a poor proxy for the coordi-
nation problem inherent in multiple banking relationships. Hence, Model I is our preferred speci-
fication. The estimation results constitute suggestive evidence that collateral (or seniority) and 
relationship lending are complementary, The results are also consistent with the idea that collat-
eral is a strategic instrument to determine bargaining power between multiple bank lenders in 
renegotiations.      
Finally, to interpret the economic significance of these results, Table X shows marginal effects 
and elasticities for the (significant) key variables, calculated at the means of the regressors.
35
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Note that the elasticities documented in Table X can directly be used to compare the absolute 
and relative impact of the regressors. Evaluated at their respective means, all three variables 
have a strong economic impact on the probability of a workout investment. For example, a 1% 
increase in the degree of collateralization leads to a 2.46% increase in the workout probability. 
These numbers confirm that both collateralization and the housebank status have an economi-
cally significant impact on workout decisions of banks. 
 
4. Discussion 
  32A firm in financial distress typically needs additional funds and expertise to solve its problems. 
This may well turn into “a matter of life and death”
36 for the troubled company. The critical 
question is: Should the business operations be continued and if so, which investor is willing to 
help working out a troubled company, putting up additional funds, giving advice, or rescheduling 
a loan? Almost invariably, troubled firms have no access to capital markets, and have to rely on 
existing lending relationships with banks. It seems to be common practice in some countries, 
Germany and Japan in particular, that the housebank, or the main bank, becomes the lender of 
last resort in those situations, sometimes even taking the lead in a reorganization process. As a 
consequence, such a special role of housebanks, if it exists, should be reflected in the structure of 
the loan contract.  
This paper has shown that the provision of collateral is one such important contractual element 
that helps to ensure lender involvement in distress. Our findings suggest that collateral is used to 
define seniority between multiple (bank) lenders and, by implication, is a complement to superior 
information about borrower quality, rather than a substitute.   
This has to be contrasted with the more common view that interprets collateral in loan contracts 
as a cushion against shocks to borrower liquidity, or as a signaling device to solve problems of 
adverse selection, or even as a substitute for monitoring of the borrower. These latter interpreta-
tions hinge, however, on collateral having high liquidation value despite corporate earning assets  
having little or no value, a condition which is met only for external assets, like a personal guar-
antee, or a portfolio of securities.  
In a data set gathered from major universal banks in Germany, we find concentration of collat-
eral to reflect the informational intensity of the bank-client relationship. Using a random sample 
of mid-cap bank-client relationships, we find that housebanks tend to hold more collateral than 
arm’s-length banks, having controlled for other factors, like firm size, default risk etc. Using a 
  33complementary firm sample data set comprising distressed borrowers, drawn from the same 
population of firms, we identify differential behavior of housebanks. We find that workout ac-
tivities are more likely when the bank is a housebank, and when the bank is more senior (more 
collateralized).  
These two results are the main contribution of our paper. They support the predictions developed 
by Welch (1997). In his model, the ex post strongest lender receives highest seniority, thereby 
minimizing ex-ante costs of renegotiations, either from deterring costly conflicts between lend-
ers, or by minimizing costs of claim enforcement, see also Bris/Welch (2002).  
The crucial interpretation of seniority as an instrument to determine bargaining power of lenders 
is of course related to the institutional design of the particular financial system. Our analysis is 
based on German data, and it is well known that the German insolvency regime strictly protects 
creditor rights. This holds for the old insolvency code which was in effect until December 1998 
(covering our observation period), and it holds for the new legislation enacted in 1999. The latter 
code introduces an automatic stay, hitherto unknown in Germany (see Franks/Nyborg/Torous 
1996 and Bartlett 1999). Note that before bankruptcy proceedings have started, any collateral - 
even on assets belonging to the physical equipment necessary for the operation of the firm - can 
be seized by the bank, if a company does not meet contractual repayments. Moreover, even if a 
formal bankruptcy procedure is eventually initiated, secured claims of banks (collateral) are pro-
tected by the legal concepts of preferential satisfaction from the asset (“Absonderung”). Hence, 
German banks can use collateral not only to compensate losses from borrower default but also as 
an strategic device to influence (or even extort) other lenders. This institutional framework 
clearly supports our interpretation of collateral being of strategic use in bargaining situations, 
and therefore is one explanation for our empirical results.  
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It will be an interesting avenue for future research to figure out the exact interdependency be-
tween the economic role of collateral and the financial system architecture.  In this sense, a com-
parison of our results with a similar study for firms under a more debtor-friendly insolvency re-
gime, in the US, for example, would be interesting.  
Our empirical results regarding ex ante loan contract design and ex post bank behavior in bor-
rower distress support the conjecture of seniority and relationship lending being complementary 
to each other. Strong financiers, i.e. housebanks, are made more senior ex ante (in "good" times), 
and become pivotal in company restructuring (in "bad" times). It is important to note two caveats 
when interpreting our results and their implications, however. First, it remains unclear whether 
the higher probability of workout investments by housebanks reflects economically “better”, that 
is more efficient, decisions. Second, our analysis does not incorporate an analysis of the success 
of workout activities. Both issues are essential for a welfare evaluation of relationship lending, 
and therefore promising objectives for future research.   37 
Appendix  Illustrative Cases with WORKOUT Investments 
 
No  General Descriptives  Workout Activity  Distress Consequence  Additional Notes 
  Distress Event  Industry  Number bank 
relationships 
Consultant  Takeover  Reorganization 
Plan 
Debt Restructur-
ing 
Bankruptcy Proceed-
ings 
Debt Write-Offs  Termination   
1 05.11.91  Chemicals  12  0  0  X  X    0  X  0  --- 
2  26.03.93  Electricity  3 0 0  X  0  0  X  0  Additional  credit  supply 
3 19.09.96  Construc-
tion 
3 X 0  0  X  0  X  0  --- 
4 28.01.94  Automotive 
supplier 
18 0 X  0  X  0  X  0  --- 
5  27.10.94  Wood  6  0  0  X   0  0  X  X  Banks become shareholder. 
Distress Event = date of initial distress event; Consultant = bank initiated or hired consultant; Takeover = bank actively engaged in search for merger /takeover candi-
date; Reorganization Plan = bank is actively engaged in development of restructuring concept, leads reorganization pool, etc.; Debt restructuring comprises loan 
volume reductions, additional collateral requirements, change in maturity structure or interest payments, etc.; Bankruptcy Proceedings = Distress ends with formal 
insolvency procedure; Debt Write-Offs = borrower loans are fully or in major parts written-off; Termination = banks cancels all loans and seizes collateral.  References 
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Table I 
Association between Housebank Status and Alternative Relationship Measures 
HB Duration  (DURAT)  Number of bank rela-
tionships 
Bank share in total debt 
financing (FINSHARE) 
0 (non-housebank)  20.2  (18.1)  6.1  (5.4)  29.2  (21.7) 
1 (housebank)  22.5  (20.7)  4.4  (2.9)  47.9  (30.7) 
Significance [p-value]  0.52  0.047**  0.0004*** 
Correlation 0.06  -0.17 0.33 
Note. All values are based on the representative R-sample and are cross-sectional means, calculated from the aver-
age time-series values per individual over the observation period 1992-1996. Numbers in parentheses are standard 
deviations. Significance indicates the p-value of a t-test of differences in means between the cases with and with-
out housebank status. Using a nonparametric Mann-Whitney-test for differences in medians leads to the same 
results. Correlation is a correlation measure controlling for the nominal scale of the housebank variable. DURAT 
is the number of years of the bank-borrower relationship, FINSHARE is the ratio of credit provided by the bank 
(from which the observation originates) to total debt (as documented in the balance sheet), multiplied by 100. 
**,***: Significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Descriptive Statistics of Borrowers in the Representative Sample 
 Size 
[thousand DM]
Leverage 
[%] 
Profitability
[%]  
Rating Limited 
Liability 
Bank 
Debt 
[%] 
Debt share fi-
nanced by our 
bank [%] 
Mean 171,798  80.02  10.53  2.93  0.81  54.89  37.97 
Median 112,623  81.30  5.40  3.00  1.00  43.49  29.94 
Std.dev. 211,633  14.82  20.30  0.82  0.39  41.57  28.69 
Note. Characteristics of the representative firm sample. Number of observations is N=125. All calculations are 
based on averages of time series observations per individual from 1992 to 1996. Size is based on annual turn-
over. Leverage is debt divided by total assets (including reserves). Profit is return on assets based on earnings 
before taxes and extraordinary items. Rating is based on standardized bank internal ratings (1 is best quality, 6 
is worst). Limited Liability is a dummy, taking value one if a firm is incorporated. Bank Debt is total debt pro-
vided by all banks of one particular borrower. The debt share financed by our bank is termed FINSHARE later 
on.  
 
  43Table III 
 Incidence of Collateral by Banks(Year 1996, All years) 
   COLYN 
    1996  1992 – 1996 
    1 0  Sum 1  0 Sum 
 1  21  2  23  100  14  114 
 2  15  11  26  72  54  126 
BANK 3  11  14  25 59  66  125 
 4  20  5  25  100  18  118 
 5  21  3  24  88  21  109 
 Sum  88  35  123  419  173  592 
Note. COLYN is binary variable indicating that loans of a borrower are collateralized (COLYN=1) or not.  
  44Table IV 
Sample Statistics 1996: Rating and Degree of Collateralization according to Type of Col-
lateral and Housebank status  
COLTYPE  HB  Observations  COLDEGREE  RATING 
0 non-housebank  20  0  3.1 
 housebank    10 0  2.6 
 Total  30 0  2.9 
1 non-housebank  32 40.0  3.2 
 housebank    21  41.6  2.7 
 Total  53  40.2  3.0 
2 Total  0  --  -- 
3 non-housebank  12 55.4  3.3 
 housebank    3  59.7  4.0 
 Total  15  56.7  3.4 
Total non-housebank  64  32.1  3.2 
 housebank    34  30.3  2.8 
 total  98  31.5  3.0 
Note. COLTYPE is a qualitative variable indicating the type of pledged collateral (0= no collateral, 1= only real 
securities, 2= only personal securities, 3= both real and personal securities); HB is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a relationship is a housebank or an arm’s-length relationship; RATING is the mean borrower rating; and 
COLDEGREE is the ratio of collateral value to total credit volume, i.e. the fraction of secured debt in terms of 
value. 
 
  45Table V 
Definition of Variables  
 Variable  Definition 
Dependent variables  COLYN  Dummy, one if loans of a borrower are collateralized. 
  COLDEGREE  Degree of loan collateralization, calculated as value of pledged 
collateral according to bank’s own assessment divided by debt 
provided by bank. 
  WORKOUT  Dummy, one if i) workout activity by our bank undertaken, or ii) 
additional funds provided (distress firm sample) 
control variables  BANK2 – BANK5  Set of dummies, 1 if debtor belongs to bank x (x=2 to 5) 
  LOGSIZE  Natural logarithm of a company’s annual sales (proxy for size) 
  LIMLIAB  Dummy, indicating private limited  companies 
  LEVERAGE  Ratio of debt to total assets according to annual reports of firms. 
  R&D  Research and development expenses, based on average industry 
expenses per unit of turnover in 1996.  
  FINSHARE  Relative importance of our bank in borrower debt financing, 
calculated as the ratio of debt provided by our bank to total debt 
financing according to the annual report of the borrower. 
risk variables  RATING3, 
RATING4,5 
Dummy variables, representing categories of bank internal rat-
ings (1 is best, 6 is worst) 
  PROFIT  Return on assets based on earnings before taxes and extraordi-
nary items. 
  VOLA  Standard deviation of PROFIT over entire observation period 
(1992-1996) 
relationship  HB  Dummy, 1 if housebank according to modified self-assessment 
of the banks. 
  #BANKS  Natural logarithm of number of bank relationships of a borrower. 
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Table VI 
Determinants of Collateralization - Panel Analysis 
Regressor 
Model I: Probit  
(dependant is  
COLYN) 
Model II: Tobit  
(dependant is 
COLDEGREE) 
Model III: Tobit  
(dependant is 
COLDEGREE) 
Constant  15.40 (0.002)***  243.30 (0.000)***  198.25 (0.000)*** 
BANK2  -4.25 (0.004)***  -48.85 (0.000)***  -33.25 (0.000)*** 
BANK3  -0.99 (0.265)  -19.68 (0.001)**  -35.15 (0.028)** 
BANK4  -0.69 (0.482)  -2.43 (0.694)  1.98 (0.687)  
BANK5  -1.13 (0.204)  15.32 (0.001)***  17.71 (0.001)*** 
LIMLIAB  -2.98 (0.000)***  -18.20 (0.000)***  -22.19 (0.000)*** 
LOGSIZE  -0.39 (0.205)  -13.99 (0.000)***  -9.78 (0.000)*** 
R&D  -0.67 (0.000)***  -6.57 (0.000)***  -3.52 (0.000)*** 
RATING3  -0.11 (0.078)*  -2.80 (0.496)  --- 
RATING4,5  0.83 (0.257)  2.52 (0.604)  --- 
PROFIT ---  ---  -0.16  (0.136) 
VOLA --- ---  -0.66  (0.029)** 
HB  4.39 (0.060)*  26.65 (0.000)***  20.02 (0.000)*** 
#BANKS  -0.99 (0.231)  -13.37 (0.000)***  -14.97 (0.000)*** 
HB x #BANKS  -1.81 (0.117)  -6.15 (0.238)  -6.60 (0.256) 
N 404  404  413 
X
2 (Explanatory variables)  43.70 (0.000)***  329.62 (0.000)***  228.77 (0.000)*** 
X
2 (Random Effects)   165.99 (0.000)***  252.25 (0.000)***  257.77 (0.000)*** 
Note. COLYN is a dummy variable, indicating whether or not collateral has been pledged, COLDEGREE is the 
ratio of collateral value to total credit volume (x 100). For definitions of explanatory variables see Table V. The 
Tobit-procedure adjusts for censoring at values of zero. p-values in parentheses. *,**,***: Significance at the 
10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively. 
  47Table VII 
Descriptive Statistics of Borrowers in the Distress Sample 
 Housebank  Non-Housebank  t-test  (p-value) 
  N  Mean (Std.dev.)  N  Mean (Std.dev.)   
LOGSIZE  20  11.55 (0.99)  42  10.775 (1.27)  0.01*** 
LIMLIAB  20  0.70 (0.47)  42  0.81 (0.40)  0.34 
PROFIT  20  -0.08 (6.18)  42  -3.03 (8.16)  0.12 
COLDEGREE  20  55.27 (33.60)  42  39.49 (26.04)  0.047 ** 
FINSHARE  20  55.20 (30.70)  42  34.32 (39.30)  0.041 ** 
Number of banks  20  4.9 (2.85)  41  6.5 (4.68)  0.09* 
Note. All calculations are based on the  distressed firm sample with N=62 observations 
(Number of banks=61 obs.). For definition of variables see Table V. *, **, ***: Signifi-
cance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively. 
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Table VIII 
Frequency Distribution of WORKOUT 
   BANK  HB 
   1  2  3  4  5  Sum  0  1  Sum 
HB  0  9 3  10 10  10 42       
 1  1 8  4  5 2 20       
 Sum  10 11  14  15 12  62       
WORKOUT  0  10 7  7  10  12 46  34  12  46 
 1  0 4  7  5 0 16  8  8  16 
 Sum  10 11  14  15 12  62  42  20  62 
Note. WORKOUT is a binary variable, indicating whether workout activities occurred or not; 
HB is housebank attribution dummy, BANK indicates the bank form which an observation 
originates. 
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Logit Regression of Workout Incidence on a Set of Explanatory Variables 
Regressors  Model I  Model II 
Constant  15.48  (0.03) **  3.70 (0.41) 
LOGSIZE  -0.96  (0.05) *  -0.38 (0.25) 
LIMLIAB  -3.05  (0.03)  **  -2.16 (0.06) * 
PROFIT  0.05 (0.53)  0.03 (0.66) 
LEVERAGE  -0.7 (0.02) **  -0.04 (0.06) * 
FINSHARE  1.70  (0.46)  --- 
#BANKS ---  1.54  (0.16) 
COLDEGREE  0.06  (0.04) **  0.02 (0.50) 
HB  6.02 (0.04)***  3.53 (0.06) * 
HB x COLDEGREE  -0.04  (0.71)  -0.03 (0.27) 
HB x FINSHARE  - 6.95  (0.11)  --- 
#BANKS x 
COLDEGREE 
--- -0.002  (0.88) 
FINSHARE x 
COLDEGREE 
- 0.15 (0.06) *  --- 
N 62  61 
LR-statistic  22.49  (0.01)***  11.64 (0.23) 
Pseudo-R
2 0.32 0.17 
Hosmer-Lemeshow-Statistic  9.95 (0.27)  7.99 (0.44) 
Note. The dependent variable is WORKOUT which is assigned a value of one if workout activities occurred, 
and zero otherwise; LOGSIZE is the natural logarithm of a company’s annual sales; LIMLIAB is binary: 1 if in-
corporated; PROFIT is return on assets based on earnings before taxes and extraordinary items; LEVERAGE is 
the ratio of total debt financing total assets; COLDEGREE is the ratio of collateral value to total credit volume 
of our bank in percentage points, HB is binary: 1 if housebank; HB x COLDEGREE the corresponding interac-
tion term; FINSHARE is the ratio of total credit volume supplied by our bank to total debt financing of the bor-
rower, HBFIN and FINCOLLAT the corresponding interaction terms with HB and COLDEGREE, respectively. 
All observations of the explanatory variables are taken at or immediately before the distress event. p-values in 
parentheses. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is a Goodness-of-Fit test with the null hypothesis of no misspecifica-
tion. *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, respectively.  
  50Table X  
Economic Significance of Logit Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient  Marginal  effect  Elasticity 
COLDEGREE  0.06 0.006  2.46 
HB  6.02 0.56  1.74 
FINSHARE x COLLDEGREE  -0.15 -0.14  -2.55 
Note. The dependent variable is the workout probability. Coefficient are the corresponding values from Model II 
in Table IX. Marginal effects and Elasticity are calculated at the means of the regressors.  
 
  51Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of COLDEGREE (Degree of Collateralization) 
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  52Endnotes 
 
1   For recent surveys on the theoretical concept of relationship lending and respective in-
ternational evidence, see Ongena/Smith (2000) and Boot (2000). 
2   Since a senior claim on an otherwise troubled firm gives the lender a first claim on fu-
ture earnings of the company (be they from operation, or from liquidation), the holder 
of a senior debt claim faces no debt overhang problem (Myers 1977) - he takes full 
benefit of a successful turnaround.  
3   In part of the literature collateral is designed as extra-company assets, like private prop-
erty or guarantees as e.g., in Bester 1985, or Manove/Padilla/Pagano 2001. We believe 
that our interpretation of collateral as a strategic device to set bargaining power between 
multiple lenders goes through as long as at least part of the pledged collateral reflects 
the company’s earning assets, i.e. as long as not all collateral refers to extra-company 
wealth. 
4   Petersen/Rajan (1995) report an average number of bank relationship for their sample of 
very small US firms to be 1.4. Elsas/Krahnen (1998) report for their sample of medium 
sized German firms an average of 6 simultaneous bank relationships. According to De-
tragiache/Garella/Guiso (2000), the average Italian firm in their sample even maintains 
16 bank relationships. 
5   Note that our analysis relies on the same data as used by Elsas/Krahnen 1998. 
  53 
6   These banks comprise the three largest German private banks, the apex cooperative 
bank, and the largest (regional) apex savings bank. In the list of the largest banks of the 
country at year end 1995, they comprise the ranks 1, 2, 3, 5, 8. 
7   For a more detailed presentation of the data set and sampling design, see Elsas et al. 
(1998). 
8   Only 12 out of 200 are public limited companies (AG). 
9   Loan size refers to total amount of debt given by the one bank (sum over all outstanding 
loans owed by the this firm vis-a-vis this bank). 
 
10  §14 of the KWG (German Banking Act) requires each bank to report the name and loan 
terms of each debtor with a consolidated debit balance of DM 3m or above. The Bun-
desbank, on behalf of the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority (BAKred), collects all 
notifications and produces a quarterly consolidated statement per customer. These are in 
turn accessible by all reporting banks.  
11   Note that the loan type criterion was in general not a binding restriction. 
12   If an individual has more than one observation in a given year, only the last one was 
used. 
13   See Table II for descriptive statistics. 
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14   The other important group of outside claimants, trade creditors, are typically not pivotal 
in renegotiations in financial distress in Germany. 
15   In the subsample of potentially distressed firms, there is only one exception where a 
bank took an equity stake after the onset of financial distress. This is taken into account 
in the analysis of Section 3.3, below. 
16   As an example, the assessment of the housebank status was based on an additional 
questionnaire. The involvement of the banks in the project explains the high response 
rate of 98%. 
17   See Brunner/Krahnen/Weber (2000) for details on the internal rating systems. 
18   While the concept of rating notches as representing discrete default intervals is similar 
to the concept used by rating agencies, the rating itself is not quite the same. Agencies 
target loss severity rather than default probabilities, and they rate through the cycle, i.e. 
construct longer-term averages, rather than specifying an exact prediction period (which 
is one year in case of our banks), see Löffler 2002. 
19   A detailed description and a systematic comparison of the banks internal rating systems 
of our sample is provided by Brunner/Krahnen/Weber (2000).  
20   Elsas (2002) provides an in-depth analysis of the characteristics associated with the 
housebank status and a comparison of the raw self-assessment and our modified attribu-
tion HB. His results indicate that the modified attribution is superior in terms of reliabil-
ity. 
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21   Note that for our data, banks do not have an incentive to report collateral values strate-
gically. For external reporting purposes, banks may have an incentive to provide exces-
sive estimates of security values only for land charges and mortgages, in order to reduce 
risk-weights for the determination of equity standards under Basel I. However, our data 
are taken from the banks’ internal files, which are instrumental for pricing decisions. 
Upwardly biased collateral value estimates would run counter to he bank’s profit mo-
tive, without any effect on regulators. We have found no indication that has lead us to 
believe these estimates to be biased. 
22   Looking at the association between debt guarantees and the status of limited liability of 
firms indicates that personal guarantees occur more often if firms are incorporated. This 
supports conventional wisdom of bankers, who claim that guarantees by managers of 
small corporations are used to elude limited liability and to „align“ incentives of man-
agers. 
23   See Greene (1997), Chapter 14 for details relating to this specification. 
24   See Baltagi (1995), pp. 183-184 for details. 
25   Note that there is no disclosure rule for R&D expenses for German firms. The respec-
tive industry data was provided by the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft.  
26   There were no observations for the worst rating class, 6, rendering the inclusion of a 
respective dummy obsolete. 
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27   We have also used Duration as a proxy for the intensity of relationship lending, but this 
variable was always insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that most of our 
firms report long relationship duration, with an average value of more than 20 years. 
28   It is likely that this reflects differences in collateral valuation procedures between the 
banks with respect to certain types of collateral like chattel mortgages. Since there is no 
reason expect different valuation procedures to be in place for housebank and arm’s-
length customers, we strongly believe that the respective dummies fully control for this 
effect and that our main results regarding relationship lending do not depend on this is-
sue.    
29  This result is similar to Machauer and Weber (1998); and to some extent to Berger and 
Udell (1995), who find only one out of eight risk measures to be a significant explana-
tory variable. 
30   Supportive actions are those activities that increase the probability of a restructuring 
being successful. Examples comprise the provision of consulting services, or the exten-
sion of additional loans, see below.  
31   Some illustrative example cases are documented in the Appendix. 
32   We do not specify other industry variables or R&D expenses since about 80% of the 
sample firms belong to the manufacturing industry. 
33   We neither do have information on the exact structure of non-bank debt financing of 
firms, nor on the financing shares of other banks than our bank. 
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34   There may be trade creditors, or other individual non-bank lenders in addition, but these 
are expected to be small in term of relative individual importance. 
35   See Greene (1997), pp. 876-880 for the details of the calculations.  
36   The title of a report on Enron’s struggle for survival, published in the Economist, Nov 
1
st, 2001. 
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